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Summary 
The nuclear deal with Iran is often hailed as one of the few diplomatic successes of EU foreign 
policy. While the convening power of the European Union in ‘the making of’ phase of the Joint 
Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) has indeed been critical and well documented, an 
independent assessment of the EU’s facilitating and mediating role in the implementation of the 
nuclear agreement has so far been lacking. This paper seeks to plug that gap. It analyses the tasks 
entrusted to the EU as the coordinator of the Joint Commission, the executive body overseeing the 
implementation of the agreement, evaluates how the EU has performed its duties and assesses 
whether the economic benefits which the EU derives from the lifting of nuclear-related sanctions 
and the opening of the Iranian market risk undermining its role as an honest broker. 
 
This paper finds that, in the Joint Commission, the EU is accepted as a primus inter pares among 
the five permanent members of the Security Council, Germany and Iran. Its role is not just to 
convene and facilitate discussions about the implementation of the nuclear deal, but also to 
mediate disputes among any of the participants. So far, it has done so successfully. But two years 
since the signing of the nuclear deal, the real stress test is about to come. How the EU will cajole 
the administration of President Trump to keep the US wedded to the JCPOA will determine not just 
the future effectiveness of the nuclear deal, but also colour the legacy of the EU and its High 
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Introduction 
The nuclear deal with Iran is often hailed as one of the few undisputed diplomatic successes of 
EU foreign policy. Thanks to the international opening to Iran that three member states (France, 
Germany and the UK) skilfully created in 2003 by operating outside of the framework of the 
Council, subsequent High Representatives were able to build consensus among the other EU 
member states and institutions. They were also able to serve as the diplomatic go-between for 
the five permanent members of the UN Security Council + Germany (‘P5+1’ aka ‘E3/EU+3’) and 
Iran, balance a dual-track approach of economic pressure and political dialogue, and broker the 
Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) on 14 July 2015. 
The EU’s own assessment of the negotiation process has been that: 
Only the European Union could have played that role. No other actor would have been 
accepted. Russia, China and the US could not have done it, but also none of the EU 
Member States could have done it. It was only the EU that was accepted because the 
EU was perceived by both sides as a neutral actor, as a moderator, a facilitator. We 
were bridge builder in the context between Iran and the US, which continues to be 
difficult.1 
While the convening power of the EU in ‘the making of’ 
phase of the nuclear agreement has indeed been critical 
and well documented,2 as yet there is no independent 
assessment of the EU’s facilitating and mediating role in 
the implementation of the agreement. Arguably, the EU 
High Representative will only merit her place among the 
                                                     
1 Helga Schmid, Executive Secretary General of the European External Action Service and leading figure in the 
nuclear talks with Iran at political director level, speaking on “Europe and Iran: Beyond the Nuclear Deal” at 
Carnegie Europe on 17th May 2017 (http://carnegieeurope.eu/2017/05/17/europe-and-iran-beyond-nuclear-
deal-event-5595).  
2 For independent assessments, see A. Viaud, L'Union européenne face à la crise du nucléaire iranien (2003-2017), 
Louvain-la-Neuve: Presses Universitaires de Louvain 2017 (https://pul.uclouvain.be/author/ 
?person_ID=6283); T. Cronberg, Nuclear Multilateralism and Iran: Inside EU Negotiations, Abingdon: Routledge, 
2017. See also C. Adebahr, Europe and Iran: The Nuclear Deal and Beyond, Abingdon: Routledge 2017; S. 
Blockmans, A. Ehteshami and G. Bahgat (eds.), EU-Iran Relations After the Nuclear Deal, Brussels: CEPS e-book 
2016. 
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pantheon of acclaimed diplomats once the JCPOA has withstood the forces of nature and is 
properly implemented. 
Two years since the signing of the nuclear deal, the challenges to the proper implementation 
of the JCPOA are both domestic and international. In the wake of the re-election of President 
Rouhani in May 2017, the focus of the hardliners in Iran is firmly on the delivery by the 
government of the promised economic gains from the 
removal of nuclear-related sanctions on the country. 
Internationally, the main challenge to the continued 
success of the JCPOA comes from a hardened US 
position under President Trump on the politics of the 
Middle East in general, and of Iran in particular. The 
Republican administration’s urge to punish the theocratic regime for its wrong-doings and to 
keep Iran’s regional ambitions in check, combined with Tehran’s incursion into Syria and sabre-
rattling with its ballistic missiles programme, have poisoned the debate on the implementation 
of the JCPOA.3 
In this paper, we examine the EU’s diplomatic role and efforts to stick to the nuclear deal. We 
start with an analysis of the interpretative scope of the JCPOA: what falls within and beyond its 
remit? We then turn to the tasks entrusted to the EU as the coordinator of the Joint 
Commission overseeing the implementation of the agreement, and assess how the EU has 
delivered on its duties. In this respect, we gauge whether the economic benefits which the EU 
derives from the lifting of nuclear-related sanctions and the opening of the Iranian market risk 
undermining its role as honest broker. 
The spirit of the JCPOA 
The JCPOA sets out the terms under which the exclusively peaceful and civilian nature of the 
Iranian nuclear programme can be guaranteed. As such, the deal aims to eliminate the risk of 
exceeding the threshold beyond which that programme is militarised. The cancellation of this 
risk requires that until 2030 Iran keeps its uranium enrichment activities below a rate of 3.67% 
and maintains a total stock of uranium under 300 kg. The guarantee of the civilian nature of 
the nuclear programme depends on Iran's commitment to reduce its total stock of enriched 
uranium by 98%. Uranium enrichment activities are now only limited to the Natanz facility in 
the Isfahan Province – the underground testing site of Fordow is off-limits. Two-thirds of 
Natanz’s centrifuges have been dismantled. Only five thousand of the old IR-1 model are 
permitted for use until 2030. Adherence to these obligations means that Iran’s ‘breakout time’4 
                                                     
3 We attach less relevance to the challenges posed to European unity by the prospect of Brexit since the UK has, 
from the very beginning of the process in 2003, acted in its own strategic interest, which it shares with the other 
European members of the P5+1. 
4 The ‘breakout time’ is the amount of time it would take Iran to acquire enough fissile material for one nuclear 
weapon. See O. Heinonen, “Iran’s Nuclear Breakout Time: A Fact Sheet”, in PolicyWatch 2394I, Policy Analysis, The 
Washington Institute, March 28, 2015. 
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is extended from three months to one year, thus enhancing the chances for international 
inspectors to detect any Iranian non-compliance in due time. The JCPOA provides for the 
reconstruction of the heavy-water reactor at Arak, with a view to cancelling the production of 
plutonium for military purposes and to devote the plant only to the production of medical 
radioisotopes. In short, the nuclear agreement contributes to the strengthening of the 1968 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). In fact, the JCPOA requires Iran to provisionally apply 
the Additional Protocol, pending ratification by the parliament by 18 October 2023 at the latest. 
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has been tasked with the continuous 
monitoring of Iranian nuclear activities at each stage of the nuclear fuel cycle.5 To that end, the 
JCPOA provides a strengthened access mechanism for the IAEA, which may request inspection 
of an Iranian nuclear site within 14 working days. If not, point 78 of the Agreement stipulates 
that: 
Iran, in consultation with the members of the Joint Commission, would resolve the 
IAEA's concerns through necessary means agreed upon between Iran and the IAEA. In 
the absence of an agreement, the members of the Joint Commission, by consensus or 
by a vote of 5 or more of its 8 members, would advise on the means necessary to 
resolve the IAEA's concerns. The process of consultation and any action with the 
members of the Joint Commission would not exceed seven days, and Iran would 
implement the necessary means within three additional days.6 
In keeping with UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 2231 of 20 July 2015,7 and following 
the confirmation by the IAEA’s Director General that Iran had provided clarity about its past 
nuclear activities and was thus in compliance with the pre-conditions for the entry into force 
of the JCPOA on 16 January 2016,8 the Security Council, the US and the EU lifted their respective 
economic and financial sanctions related to Iran’s nuclear programme. 
In addition to the lifting of sanctions adopted to give effect to UNSCR 2231 in the EU legal order, 
the European Union has also lifted the nuclear-related sanctions that it adopted autonomously. 
Imposed between 2010 and 2012, these measures targeted the financial, banking, insurance, 
petroleum, gas, petrochemical and shipbuilding and transport sectors, as well as gold, precious 
metals, banknotes and coins, metals and software markets. EU autonomous sanctions targeting 
Iranian persons and entities linked to the violation of human rights continue to apply, however.9 
                                                     
5 The JCPOA also provides that the IAEA regularly updates the UN Security Council. 
6 JCPOA, p. 43. 
7 S/RES/2231 (2015): http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2231%282015%29.  
8 IAEA Board of Governors, “Verification and Monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations 
Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015)”, Report by the Director General, January 16, 2016, GOV/INF/2016/1. 
9 See the designated website of the Council of the European Union, “EU restrictive measures against Iran” 
(http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/sanctions/iran/). 
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The United States only lifted its so-called ‘secondary sanctions’, i.e. the restrictive measures 
autonomously adopted by Congress from 2010 onwards in relation to the nuclear 
programme.10 The primary sanctions that were adopted in the aftermath of the hostage crisis 
of the US Embassy in Iran in 1979 are not affected. These sanctions consist of a trade 
embargo,11 assets-freezes on terrorists and their supporters12 and human rights violators,13 and 
a restriction on imports of goods, technologies and services provided by third parties in 
connection with the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. In fact, the US has ramped 
up its primary sanctions. One day after the entry into force of the JCPOA, the US Treasury 
Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) imposed targeted sanctions against 11 
entities and individuals involved in procurement on behalf of Iran’s ballistic missile 
programme.14 In response to ballistic missile tests conducted by Iran on 31 January 2017, the 
new US administration adopted further sanctions, freezing the financial assets of 13 people and 
12 entities based in the United Arab Emirates, Lebanon and China. Iran has denounced these 
US sanctions as illegal and announced its intention to retaliate by imposing “legal restrictions 
targeting American individuals and entities assisting regional terrorist groups.”15 Yet the new 
sanctions adopted by the US are in line with the terms of the JCPOA, which states that 
proliferation-related sanctions and restrictive measures will only be lifted on 18 October 2023 
if the IAEA confirms the peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear activities. The EU too maintains 
sanctions related to missile technology, as well as an embargo of arms of all types included in 
the EU common military list, and restrictions on certain nuclear-related transfers and activities. 
These measures target the dissemination of weapons by Iran in the Middle East and have 




                                                     
10 Articles 4.1-4.7 of Annex II and 17.1-17.2 of Annex V of the JCPOA. See also U.S. Department of the Treasury, 
“Frequently Asked Questions Relating to the Lifting of Certain U.S. Sanctions Under the Joint Comprehensive Plan 
of Action (JCPOA) on Implementation Day”, June 8, 2016. 
11 See “Executive Order 13599” and “Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations.” 
12 See “Executive Order 13224.” 
13 See Executive Orders, 13553, 13628 and 13606. 
14 See U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Treasury Sanctions Those Involved in Ballistic Missile Procurement for 
Iran”, 17 January 2016.  
15 Y. Torbati, “Trump Administration Tightens Iran Sanctions, Tehran hits Back,” in Reuters, 3 February 2017. 
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Role of the EU in the Joint Commission 
The JCPOA established a Joint Commission to monitor the implementation of the nuclear deal. 
The Joint Commission comprises representatives of the P5+1 and Iran. Assigned by the 
agreement as one of the ‘participants’ and ‘coordinator’ of the Joint Commission, the European 
Union plays a leading role in overseeing the implementation of the JCPOA. The EU, by way of 
its High Representative and supported by the European External Action Service (EEAS), is also 
vested with the task of coordinating two working groups, one on procurement and another on 
the implementation of sanctions lifting.16 The EU’s 
diplomatic authority was formalised in international legal 
terms when the UN Security Council endorsed the JCPOA 
in Resolution 2231 (2015) and urged its full 
implementation on the timetable established in the deal. 
The JCPOA prescribes that the “Joint Commission will meet on a quarterly basis and at any time 
upon request of a JCPOA participant to the Coordinator” in New York, Vienna or Geneva, 
keeping the meetings confidential.17 The only traces of the five meetings that have taken place 
since the entry into force of the JCPOA are the statements published on the website of the 
EEAS18 and the nine documents of the Joint Commission published on the website of the IAEA 
as clarifications of the substance of the JCPOA and the functioning of the Joint Commission 
itself.19  
                                                     
16 Sections 6 and 7 of Annex IV of the JCPOA, pp. 3-6 (http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/statements-
eeas/docs/iran_agreement/annex_4_joint_commission_en.pdf). Practice has shown that the working group on 
civil nuclear cooperation, in which the ‘E3/EU+3’ participates, has been important to bring Iran back into the 
international scientific community – and thus increase its cost of a potential future walk-out. See JCPOA, “Annex 
III - Civil Nuclear Cooperation” (https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/245322.pdf). 
17 Since Implementation Day 21, the procurement working group meets every three weeks in Vienna to discuss 
“items, materials, equipment, goods and technology indented to be used in nuclear activities authorized by the 
JCPOA.” See IAEA, Information Circular INFCIRC/907, p. 17. The sanctions working group has had one official 
meeting but sanctions experts are in a regular contact and have held several informal meetings. 
18 Statement of 19 October 2015 is available at https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/ 
5836/press-release-outcome-first-joint-commission-joint-comprehensive-plan-action-jcpoa-iranian_en. 
Statement of 19 July 2016 is available at https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/7271/ 
press-release-holding-joint-commission-jcpoa_en. Remarks by High Representative Mogherini following the 
ministerial meeting of the Joint Commission on the implementations of the JCPOA on 23 September 2016: 
https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/10296/remarks-high-representative-mogherini-
following-ministerial-meeting-joint-commission_en. Statement of 10 January 2017: https://eeas.europa.eu/ 
headquarters/headquarters-homepage/18436/press-release-behalf-joint-commission-jcpoa-10-january-
2017_en. Statement of 25 April 2017: https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage_en/ 
25069/25%20April%202017%20meeting%20of%20the%20JCPOA%20Joint%20Commission. 
19 IAEA, Information Circular INFCIRC/907, “Communication dated 21 December 2016 to the Agency sent on behalf 
of High Representative Mogherini in her capacity as Coordinator of the Joint Commission established under the 
Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action,” 23 December 2016 
(https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/publications/documents/infcircs/2016/infcirc907.pdf); IAEA, 
Information Circular INFCIRC/907/Add.1, “Communication dated 11 January 2017 to the Agency sent on behalf of 
High Representative Mogherini in her capacity as Coordinator of the Joint Commission established under the Joint 
The EU’s diplomatic authority was 
formalised in international legal terms 
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The public statements show that four of the five meetings were held at the level of Political 
Directors of JCPOA participating countries, chaired by the Secretary General of the EEAS Helga 
Schmid,20 and one at ministerial level, chaired by EU High Representative Federica Mogherini 
in the context of the 2016 UN General Assembly. These statements also illustrate the ability of 
the EU to muster the technical, legal and diplomatic 
expertise needed to implement the powers conferred on 
it by the JCPOA. The role of the EU as the chief guarantor 
of the JCPOA becomes clear with regard to the 
preservation of the deal from contamination by external 
issues, such as questions about the role of Iran in regional conflicts and the adoption of US 
sanctions on the Iranian ballistic missile programme. In response to the concerns raised by Iran 
in December 2016, the EU convened the Joint Commission on 10 January 2017 in a successful 
effort to conciliate between the two arch rivals. Afterwards, the following statement was 
published: 
The Joint Commission underscored the sanctions lifting commitments contained in the 
JCPOA, in particular as they relate to the Iran Sanctions Act, and recognised the United 
States' assurance that extension of the Iran Sanctions Act does not affect in any way 
the sanctions lifting Iran receives under the deal or the ability of companies to do 
business in Iran consistent with the JCPOA.21 
As far as the nine clarifying documents on the IAEA website are concerned: these deal with 
technical issues related to the percentage of uranium enrichment; the dimensions of hot cells; 
the transfer of Tehran Research Reactor partially fabricated fuel plates out of Iran; a template 
for describing types of centrifuges; the procedure to determine the SWU (separative work unit) 
to three centrifuge types; Practical arrangements for the Procurement Working Group and the 
Commission for matters relating to the Procurement Channel; the End-Use Certification; and 
the transfer out of Iran of any heavy water in excess of 130 metric tonnes.  
The latter document refers to a slight overshooting of the limit of heavy water held by Iran. 
Known as the Oman loophole “whereby Iran can store offshore in Oman heavy water it owns 
and controls in excess of the nuclear deal’s limits, awaiting its eventual sale,”22 the absence of 
                                                     
Comprehensive Plan of Action,” 12 January 2017 (https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/publications/ 
documents/infcircs/2016/infcirc907a1.pdf).  




22 D. Albright and A. Stricker, “Heavy Water Loophole in the Iran Deal”, in Institute for Science and International 
Security, 21 December 2016. See also Dawn, “Iran to sell 40 tonnes of heavy water to US”, 13 January 2016. 
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powers conferred on it by the JCPOA. 
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any formal prohibition by the JCPOA of additional Iranian production of heavy water, as long as 
Iran finds a buyer, presents a risk of Iran becoming a nuclear supplier.23 Inspectors detected 
two violations of the narrow limit of 130 metric tons of heavy water that Iran is allowed hold, 
which prompted the Iranians to immediately correct the situation. This shows that the 
monitoring mechanisms on which the JCPOA rests, and indeed the Joint Commission’s role in 
interpreting and ‘enforcing’ the deal, are functioning.24 
In the case of disputes, the Joint Commission may trigger 
the resolution mechanism provided by the JCPOA. This 
mechanism allows any participant to refer to the Joint 
Commission the lack of conformity of any party to its 
commitments for resolution.25 The procedure follows four 
steps:  
(i) A JCPOA participant may refer the issue to the Joint Commission, which would have 15 
days to resolve the issue unless the time period was extended by consensus. Here, the 
EU — as coordinator — would play a key role as facilitator and mediator, unless of course 
it were the participant raising the issue of non-compliance. To preserve its role as 
coordinator, the EU would in that case be advised to ‘delegate’ the referral of the issue 
to one of the E3 members. 
(ii) In case of non-resolution by the Joint Commission, any participant could refer the issue 
to the Ministers of Foreign Affairs who would also have 15 days to resolve the issue, 
unless the time period was extended by consensus. The EU High Representative is 
present whenever the Joint Commission has to meet at ministerial level but does not take 
part in decision-making on nuclear-related transfers and activities as set out in section 6 
of Annex IV. 
(iii) If these two first steps fail to produce a solution, then a participant could request that 
the issue be considered by an ‘Advisory Board’, which would consist of three external 
members appointed by the participants involved in the dispute. The arbitral commission 
would then provide a non-binding opinion on the compliance issue within 15 days. 
(iv) If the issue still has not been resolved to the satisfaction of the complainant, then that 
participant of the Joint Commission could take the case to the UN Security Council, which 
would have to vote, within 30 days of the notification, on a resolution whether or not to 
continue the sanctions lifting. If no such resolution were adopted within the said 
                                                     
23 See D. Albright and A. Stricker, “U.S. Purchase of Iran’s Heavy Water: Encouraging a Dangerous Nuclear 
Supplier”, in Institute for Science and International Security, 23 May 2016. 
24 See also Iranian media reports about the purchase by Iran of “yellow cake” 
(http://www.presstv.com/Detail/2017/02/06/509292/iran-aeoi-natural-uranium-salehi). The ultimate 
‘sanctioning’ power provided for by the JCPOA does not lie with the Joint Commission but with the UN Security 
Council. See the fourth step in the dispute settlement mechanism described below. 
25 See JCPOA, p. 17 (http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/statements-eeas/docs/iran_agreement/iran_joint-
comprehensive-plan-of-action_en.pdf).  
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timeframe, then the sanctions provisions of the old UNSC resolutions would ‘snap back’, 
i.e. be reimposed on Iran, unless the UN Security Council decided otherwise. 
On the basis of the foregoing and the information that is in 
the public domain, one can deduce that the EU has played 
its multifaceted role as coordinator to the full: as convener, 
compliance-checker, legal interpreter, mediator and 
conciliator, i.e. a trustworthy guardian of the JCPOA. Two 
years since the signing of the JCPOA there is no evidence to 
suggest that the other participants of the Joint Commission 
do not value the role of the EU as coordinator. 
Ahead of the second anniversary of the implementation of 
the nuclear agreement, EU High Representative Federica 
Mogherini welcomed the implementation of the deal and 
the political will of each participant to achieve progress: 
We had just ten days ago the sixth IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] report 
saying that the agreement is fully implemented. So we are defeating all these sceptics 
who first were betting on the impossibility to have an agreement, then on the 
impossibility of having the agreement starting to be put in place when we got to the 
implementation day, and then were saying in any case it will never hold; and now we 
are getting close to the second year and for the sixth time the IAEA says that it is fully 
implemented.26 
In issuing the (self-)congratulatory statement to mark the second anniversary of the JCPOA, 
Mogherini also recognised the single-most important danger to the future effectiveness of the 
deal, as indeed her own legacy in this respect: President Trump’s stance towards Iran. 
 
 
                                                     
26 European External Action Service, “Remarks by the High Representative/Vice-President Federica Mogherini at 
the press briefing in the margins of the Oslo Forum”, Oslo, 13 June 2017. See also the statement issued to mark 
the first anniversary of the JCPOA (https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-
homepage/18609/statement-federica-mogherini-first-anniversary-implementation-jcpoa_en). 
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EU-Iran relations: from nuclear non-proliferation to socio-economic cooperation 
At the beginning of its mandate, the Trump-led administration has initiated a review of the 
JCPOA.27 The rationale behind the order is informed by longstanding ideological animosity 
towards Iran, entertained by Republicans since the 1979 hostage crisis, and the transactional 
attitude to international relations by the new President, who is keen to prevent other states 
benefitting from increased trade benefits with Iran while the US adopts ‘self-restraint’ in its 
dealings with a regime that supports international terrorism. By the White House’s own 
admission, President Trump has gone so far as to put pressure on his fellow leaders gathered 
at the G20 summit in Hamburg to “stop doing business 
with nations that sponsor terrorism, especially Iran.”28 
The stance of the new US administration is not just 
problematic in and of itself. It also touches on the long-
stated ambitions of the EU and its member states to 
improve economic relations with Iran, and raises 
questions about the perception by all participants to the 
Joint Commission of the impartiality of the Coordinator. 
In the context of this paper, we zoom in on the role of the 
EU.  
Since the suspension of the negotiations of a Trade and Cooperation Agreement and Political 
Dialogue Agreement in 2003, 12 years of diplomatic negotiations exclusively focused on the 
Iranian nuclear issue, the entry into force of the JCPOA and the subsequent lifting of nuclear-
related sanctions have paved the way for efforts by the EU and Iran to deepen and widen their 
political and socio-economic relations.29 
The joint statement delivered by High Representative Mogherini and Iranian Foreign Minister 
Zarif on 16 April 2016 paved the way for different and successive visits, back and forth at both 
technical and political level, to foster the areas of energy, climate, research and innovation, 
drugs, human rights, migration, transport, economic and civil nuclear cooperation.30 As a result 
of these exchanges, an EU-Iran High-Level Seminar on ‘International Nuclear Cooperation: 
                                                     
27 Secretary of State Rex Tillerson told reporters on 19 April 2017, that the administration will “review completely 
the JCPOA itself.” Letter available at https://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2017/04/ 
270315.htm. See further K. Katzman and P. Kerr, “Iran Nuclear Agreement”, Congressional Research Service 
Report, 21 April 2017, p. 28 (https://fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/R43333.pdf).  
28 The White House Office of the Press Secretary, Press Briefing by Principal Deputy Press Secretary Sarah Sanders 
and Director of Legislative Affairs Marc Short, 10 July 2017 (https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2017/07/10/press-briefing-principal-deputy-press-secretary-sarah-sanders-and). 
29 See S. Blockmans, A. Ehteshami and G. Bahgat (eds.), EU-Iran Relations after the Nuclear Deal (Brussels, CEPS e-
book 2016). 
30 On 16 April 2016, Mogherini led a team of no fewer than 7 Commissioners to Iran. See 
https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage_en/2281/Iran%20and%20the%20EU. An EU 
liaison team is co-located in the Embassy of the Netherlands. See 
https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage_en/2281/Iran%20and%20the%20EU. 
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Expectations and Responsibilities’ and the inaugural Iran-EU Business Forum on Sustainable 
Energy took place in the first quarter of 2017.31 
The rapprochement has been fruitful with regard to the industrial contracts signed by European 
multinational companies like Enel,32 Saipen,33 Peugeot,34 Siemens,35 Airbus,36 Renault,37 and 
Total.38 While structural impediments to trade and investment remain, bilateral trade in the 
first 16 months since the nuclear deal took effect has increased by 79% compared to 2015, 
while Iran’s exports to the EU rose by 450% – albeit it from a very low baseline.39 Whereas the 
EU used to be the first trading partner of Iran, it now only ranks as the fifth trade partner of 
Iran, accounting for 6% of Iran's trade.40 The United Arab Emirates and China are now Iran's 
main trade partners, accounting for 23.6% and 22.3% of Iran's trade respectively. In the EU’s 
own assessment: 
Oil revenues have returned to pre-sanctions levels. Oil debts are being recovered. The 
GDP has grown sharply and investment and infrastructure have resumed. (…) This is 
not to deny that growth has not been uneven in some areas. We need more progress 
                                                     
31 See European Commission, “EU-Iran High-Level Seminar on 'International Nuclear Cooperation: Expectations 
and Responsibilities' takes place” and European Commission, “Commissioner Arias Cañete in Iran for the first-ever 
Iran-EU Business Forum on Sustainable Energy”. 
32 See http://www.hellenicshippingnews.com/italys-enel-trade-to-buy-irans-lng/.  
33 See https://apnews.com/0a37f20a0a0045dd9ca74196456d68cf/iran-and-italy-sign-several-deals-during-visit-
pm-renzi.  
34 French carmaker Peugeot-Citroen resumed its partnership with Tehran-based Khodro under a €400m joint 
venture. See https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jun/22/peugeot-citroen-back-on-the-road-in-iran-with-
deal-to-build-cars.  
35 In October 2016, the company signed a multi-million-euro contract with Iran’s industrial MAPNA Group a 
contract to supply 50 diesel-electric locomotives to the Iranian Islamic Republic Railways. 
36 In December 2016, under a deal worth $18 billion, Iran purchased 100 Airbus planes. See 
https://www.usnews.com/news/business/articles/2017-01-12/irans-first-new-airbus-jetliner-lands-in-tehran.  
37 After resuming its joint venture signed in 2004 with Iran's Industrial Development Renovation Organisation 
(IDRO), French automaker Renault has registered an unprecedented 161.5% increase in sales in the first quarter 
of 2017. See https://financialtribune.com/articles/economy-auto/63303/renault-iran-sales-up-161-in-q1.  
38 On 3 July 2017, French oil company Total has signed a $4.8 billion deal with Iran for the development of South 
Pars gas field, in which it now has a 50.1% stake, alongside state-owned China National Petroleum Corporation 
(30%) and Iran’s Petropars (19.9 %). Gas production for the Iranian market will start in 2021. See 
http://www.cnbc.com/2017/07/03/iran-to-sign-new-ipc-gas-deal-with-total-for-south-pars.html.  
39 See European Commission, “Commissioner Arias Cañete in Iran for the first-ever Iran-EU Business Forum on 
Sustainable Energy”.  
40 European Commission, Trade, “Iran” (http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/countries/iran/). 
The balance in trade with Iran was €2,7 billion in 2016. Except for 2009, trade balances for the previous 10 years 
with Iran were mostly negative. The EU exported over €8.2 billion worth of goods to Iran in 2016. EU exports to 
Iran are mainly machinery and transport equipment (€3.8 billion, 46.2%), chemicals (€1.8 billion, 22.2%), and 
manufactured goods (€0.7billion, 8.8%). The EU imported almost €5.5 billion worth of goods from Iran in 2016. 
Most EU imports from Iran are energy-related (mineral fuels account for €4.2 billion and 77.0% of EU imports from 
Iran), followed by manufactured goods (€0.4 billion, 8.5%), and food (€0.3 billion, 6.8%). In 2016, EU imports from 
Iran increased by 344.8% and EU exports increased by 27.8%. 
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in the banking sector. Banks remain reluctant over compliance in some cases. But there 
are positive aspects as banks are reconnected to SWIFT. But Iran needs to do its part 
and to address the need to modernize the banking sector and to comply with the 
requirement to fight terrorism financing and money laundering.41 
The EU thus not only has a security and diplomatic but also 
a great economic interest in the continued success of the 
JCPOA. The latter is a prerequisite for wider and more 
effective engagement with Iran, not the other way 
around. However, in what is perhaps a Freudian slip, 
Mogherini herself introduced “the gradual reengagement 
in all sectors” into the remit of the nuclear deal. Arguably, 
she faced a Catch 22 situation in which she was forced, on the one hand, to be seen by the 
participants of the Joint Commission to play a neutral role as coordinator of the JCPOA, while 
on the other hand having to protect and promote, in her capacity as High Representative, the 
EU’s general interest in widening economic relations with Iran. It is worth quoting from a recent 
press conference Mogherini gave with the Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov: 
‘Q.  You mentioned the complete implementation of the Iranian nuclear accord. A 
White House spokeswoman said yesterday that Trump pressed fellow G20 leaders last 
weekend to stop doing any business with states supporting terrorism, especially – and 
I am quoting: Iran. Is that a violation of the Iranian nuclear deal? And what do – what 
is the response of the EU and Russia to those comments? 
A. On Iran, I simply reply with the numbers of trade and investments that from the 
European Union have increased to Iran in terms of double digits and this will continue. 
We see a security interest to not only fully implement the nuclear deal but also engage 
with Iran. And we see also, obviously, an economic interest on the European Union 
side. 
We will make sure – I think together, but particularly personally as someone that has 
this responsibility to ensure – that the deal is fully implemented, and also as the 
European Union that is united on this. We will ensure that engagement with Iran will 
continue and that the deal will be implemented in all its parts by all. This means the 
nuclear part, this means also all the rest like the lifting of sanctions, as you know, and 
the gradual reengagement in all sectors. This is something that the European Union is 
doing, Member States are doing and we are committed to continue to do it.’42 
                                                     
41 Helga Schmid, Executive Secretary General of the European External Action Service and leading talks with Iran 
in the Joint Commission at political director level, speaking on the record about “Europe and Iran: Beyond the 
Nuclear Deal” at Carnegie Europe on 17th May 2017 (http://carnegieeurope.eu/2017/05/17/europe-and-iran-
beyond-nuclear-deal-event-5595).  
42 Remarks by High Representative/Vice-President Federica Mogherini following a meeting with Foreign Minister 
of the Russian Federation, Sergey Lavrov, Brussels, 11 July 2017, Press release 170711_17, available at 
https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/29710/remarks-high-representativevice-
president-federica-mogherini-following-meeting-foreign_en . Italics added. 
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In an effort, therefore, to sidestep the connection made by President Trump between doing 
business with Iran and indirectly supporting terrorism, Mogherini sought refuge in the nexus 
between renewed economic relations with Iran and the implementation of the JCPOA. 
However, by doing so, the EU High Representative inadvertently imported a foreign element 
into what is and remains a purely nuclear agreement.  
Arguably, any participant in the Joint Commission would be 
better advised to adopt a strict reading of the JCPOA so as to 
prevent it from being tainted by arguments that fall outside 
the deal and could undermine it. This applies in particular to 
the coordinator, as such issues fall outside its powers as a 
facilitator and mediator and undermine the EU’s authority to 
act as an honest broker. The challenge posed to the deal by 
the Trump-led administration puts the EU in the 
uncomfortable position of having to choose between its role 
as guardian of the JCPOA, protecting it from interpretative 
drift, and confronting the US on the issue of good faith in 
living up to its multilateral commitments. On this issue, Mogherini has taken the right approach 
by stating that: 
I know that in the United States there is a review ongoing. We respect it, but we have 
also the duty to make it clear, the nuclear deal does not belong to one country – it 
belongs to the international community, to the United Nations system. It was endorsed 
by the UN Security Council with a resolution and I think we share responsibility to make 
sure that this continues to be fully implemented by all.43 
Russia and China favour the diplomatic role of the EU High Representative as a counterbalance 
to the presence of the US within the Joint Commission. Considering the animosities towards 
Iran revived by the Trump-led US administration, the Chinese are prudent to invest in Iran even 
if Beijing has a major interest in Iranian energy supplies. 
For its part, Moscow is cooperating with Tehran in Syria 
and the Russia-led Eurasian Economic Union aims to 
finalise a free-trade deal before 2018, as announced since 
29 May 2017.44 
While the US is not in the position to unilaterally cancel the 
multilateral nuclear deal, it can make its implementation 
very difficult. The moment of truth for the EU to develop a 
more strategic vision for its relations with Iran, and a set of 
tactics to deal with US of President Trump, has therefore arrived. 
                                                     
43 Idem. 
44 See https://www.ft.com/content/e2d7da8c-3ee8-11e7-9d56-25f963e998b2?mhq5j=e1.  
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Concluding remarks 
Two years since the signing of the JCPOA and in the wake of the re-election of President 
Rouhani in May 2017, it is fair to say that the EU has demonstrated its capacity of leading a 
complex international monitoring and mediation mechanism while improving its bilateral 
political and economic relations with Iran. The EU’s prestigious diplomatic role was carved out 
for and by High Representative Javier Solana in November 2004, consolidated during a decade 
of negotiations, and broadened and formalised with the signature of the JCPOA and the 
subsequent endorsement by the UN Security Council. The EU High Representative now formally 
coordinates the executive body of the nuclear agreement. In the Joint Commission, the EU is 
accepted as a primus inter pares among the five permanent members of the Security Council, 
Germany and Iran. Its role is not just to convene and facilitate discussions about the 
implementation of the nuclear deal, but also to mediate disputes among any of the 
participants. So far, it has done so successfully. But the real stress test is about to come. How 
the EU will cajole the administration of President Trump to keep the US wedded to the JCPOA 
will determine not just the effectiveness of the nuclear deal, but also colour the legacy of the 
EU and its High Representative as a diplomatic actor on the global stage. 
